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This commentary responds to Everett Spain, Gautam Mukunda, and Archie
Bates’s article, “The Battalion Commander Effect,” published in the Autumn
2021 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 3).
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he article, “The Battalion Commander Effect,” is a helpful,
additional step in addressing one possible correlate of lieutenant
retention, arguing for its role as key determinant in junior officer
stay-or-leave decisions—while simultaneously advocating for the role of retention
in senior officer promotion decisions. At face value the article oversimplifies,
given several possible methodological issues, while making a leap to promotion
board determinations. Analyses should be expanded, with detailed quantifiable
results provided before any serious discussion of policy implications (for
example, promotion board decisions affecting former battalion commanders),
are undertaken. Methodological concerns, including possible omitted variable
bias, should be addressed to confirm validity, before far-reaching implications for
practice are drawn.1
Expanding analysis “out” would include both company and brigade commander
effects, in addition to the current battalion commander effects. Expanding it
“down” would add more refined assessments of battalion commander effectiveness;
some via Officer Evaluation Reports, others potentially via “360 evaluation”
of leaders. Once done, detailed results, including regression coefficients and
p-values, could be included in tabular form, for example, in an appendix if
preferred due to space constraints. Showing the relative effect, and power, of
each is key to a more complete understanding of the battalion commander effect.
That battalion commanders have a major effect on lieutenant retention in
relation to other factors is undisputable. They do, after all, “check the box” on
the lieutenant’s evaluation, from “Most Qualified” to “Unqualified.”2 By the
1. Humbeto Barreto and Frank M. Howland, “Omitted Variable Bias,” in Introductory Econometrics:
Using Monte Carlo Simulation with Microsoft Excel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and
Kevin A. Clarke, “The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research,” in
Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 4 (September 2005): 341–52, https://doi.
org/10.1080/07388940500339183.
2. Headquarters Department of the Army, Revised Officer Evaluation Reports, April 1, 2014,
Implementation.
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major promotion board, likely future battalion commanders have already been
earmarked. Junior officers through the rank of captain also know if they are
“going places,” or will be left behind, as a direct function of those assessments.
During years of working officer retention in the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Army/G-1, with officer analysis at the year-group level of detail,
I noted many former officers from my West Point class who, on discerning
they would not be battalion commanders, left service after company commands
and moved on to rewarding careers in the private sector. This is not unusual,
among service academy graduates—they are prized by industry, too, given the
breadth and depth of academic and leadership training: if they leave early.
That specific behaviors and overall effectiveness (apparently not measured
or employed) of battalion leaders can also be a major correlate of retention
(not a predictor, though, as the authors note) is also not in dispute. Alongside
other “leadership” variables, the singular battalion commander effect measured
generically in the study may well diminish—and significantly. Likewise it could be
shown to be stronger still for “good” battalion commanders versus weaker ones, if
such variables were measured and included in analysis.
Leadership variables (for example, additional independent variables in
regression equations) might include tactical and technical proficiency via the
leader’s professional standing, as measured by evaluations at the time those
lieutenants were assigned; the same is true for leader interpersonal qualities (for
example, “people skills”) and sincerity—does the leader act without pretense?
If these qualities were added to the study, greater value could be obtained and
the variables could eventually become points on a “talent checklist” that could
more effectively assess the impact of a commander.
Hence, more could be done with a statistical sample of 1,745 former battalion
commanders and their 36,032 lieutenants. Roughly 20 lieutenants per former
battalion commander can provide significantly more by way of insight than the
study reveals, via interviews and focus groups to expand the basic findings.
Details of the additional empirical tests that were mentioned on other leaders
need to be included in the article; it appears company commander impacts may
have been included, but details are not provided. Brigade-level leadership does
not appear to be included in the analysis at all. Independent variables used in
the Spain, et al., study, in addition to former battalion commander, included
officer commissioning year (year group), post, branch, source of commission,
gender, race/ethnicity, age, commission source quality, marital and child status,
and graduation from prestigious tactical schools (for example, Airborne and
Ranger schools). Instead, more evaluation by way of so-called lateral comparison
of battalion commander effect to company and brigade commander effect can,
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and should, infuse the analysis and discussion and enhance construct validity.
Are we measuring what we think we are measuring(?)—that is, decision to leave
service, as a function of leadership, and whose leadership? Such “apples-to-apples”
comparison is essential.
In summary, the most important implication of the study for practice,
assessing battalion commanders on officer retention, could well be based on a
false set of assumptions (for example, that it was the battalion commander and
his effects driving losses). This common misperception ended many promising
careers in an earlier day, when reenlistment rates were a criteria for evaluation
for both battalion and company commanders. Ironically, this was the period
of the “hollow Army,” with enlisted cohort high-school graduation rates at a
low point for the volunteer Army, and bottom quartile on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test at a record high. The Atlantic article, “Why Our Best Officers
Leave,” notes correlates from weak generalship to bureaucratic management
that stifle initiative and entrepreneurship.3 Finally, service academy graduates do
leave active duty at a relatively high rate. Given the cost to produce these
officers, which is higher than for other commissioning sources, there is
another field for further study.4
Next steps should include expanding analysis as indicated and conducting
structured interviews with high-performing battalion commanders and focus
groups with their junior officer cohorts, following the formers’s change of
command. A plausible addition to the body of work—and easy to implement—
would be a survey of all lieutenants and junior captains leaving active duty and
their reasons for resigning. Questions could be formed under an organizing
scheme that focuses on Army, local command climate (battalion, brigade, and
installation), private sector, and personal (for example, family).
There are a number of ways to pinpoint the problem of junior officer
retention. As the US Army moves back into a period of relative stability without
war and the drawdown effects that have followed three times in the last 50
years—after Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the war in Iraq—the time to do so is
at hand.

3. Tim Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” Atlantic (website), January/February 2011,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officers-are-leaving/308346/.
4. Kyle Rempfer, “Service Academy Graduates Could See Longer Military Obligations,”
Military Times (website), July 15, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/07/15/service
-academy-graduates-could-see-longer-military-obligations/.
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W

e thank our colleague for both his distinguished Army career and
his thoughtful and comprehensive review of our manuscript. Also,
we are grateful for Parameters providing us the space and audience to
engage in this important dialogue. We humbly offer the following response.
The purpose of our study was to empirically investigate the anecdotal
relationship between battalion commanders and their lieutenants’ retention (for
example, BCE), and our analysis found there was, in fact, a statistically significant
correlation between them. Our colleague argues our analysis would be improved
if we included leadership-related variables about the battalion commanders,
such as sincerity, people skills, and tactical and technical competence. We
agree these variables (and several others) could be mechanisms of a battalion
commander’s influence on his or her lieutenants, but we are not aware of a
reasonable mechanism to get these data in sufficient numbers of former battalion
commanders to test them statistically. He also argues brigade and company
commanders may similarly influence lieutenants’ retention decisions and
should be included in the analysis. This is certainly plausible. We decided not to
include brigade commanders since they have relatively infrequent interactions
with lieutenants and, therefore, likely slight influence over their propensity to
continue to serve. In retrospect, we could have included brigade commanders
in our analysis and let the statistics confirm (or deny) this.
Regarding including company commanders in our analysis: we did not
include them and believe not doing so was wise. First, the climates company
commanders set are influenced significantly by their battalion commanders,
but not vice versa. So, an empirical analysis that included both company and
battalion commanders in the same regression would likely obscure each
variable’s predictive effect. Second, company commanders lead roughly three to
six lieutenants each, which is not a large enough group size to test empirically
with statistical confidence. Ultimately, we worked to avoid over-specifying our
regression by identifying a small, yet meaningful, subset of variables for our
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analysis, given it was both impractical and unwise to measure and include every
contextual variable.
We agree readers would benefit from more statistical evidence of our
findings, such as tabular lists of regression coefficients, p-values, and other
data customarily depicted in papers based on empirical analysis. However, at
the time of our submission, Parameters restricted authors to two or fewer
graphics. We understand Parameters is in the process of adding a feature,
which will allow future authors to include hyperlinks to additional online
content, which is welcome news for researchers who wish to publish in
Parameters. Earlier in our careers, we were frustrated to learn many scholarly
publications charge fees to practitioners to download their articles (for example,
“Early Predictors of Successful Military Careers among West Point Cadets,”
Military Psychology, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/08995605.2020.180128
5) which severely reduces the likelihood of Army leaders reading, sharing,
discussing, and challenging their ideas. This is one of the reasons we targeted
the open-access Parameters for our research, and we are grateful for its refereed
peer-reviewed publication of our article.
Based on his cautionary experiences of watching the Army evaluate
commanders according to their reenlistment rates, our colleague suggests the
Army should be wary of using the BCE as an evaluation criterion for senior
officers. We acknowledge the evidence we found on the BCE is more correlative
than causal in nature. This is one of the reasons our paper suggests the BCE not
be singularly considered as the definitive measure of leadership (or lack thereof ),
but as one of several informing assessments that can better contextualize
leaders’ influence from many perspectives and within context. We encourage
future researchers to investigate the BCE’s causal chain by using various
empirical techniques to help establish causality, such as using an instrumental
variable. Regardless of whether the Army decides to use the BCE to inform
senior officer promotion and selection decisions (performance feedback), it
should certainly establish a mechanism to provide BCE data to officers to
encourage them to reflect on how they are treating/leading their lieutenants
(developmental feedback).
Finally, our colleague’s suggestion the Army give all departing lieutenants
formal exit interviews is wise, and we have advocated for this for some time
(for example, “Making Exit Interviews Count,” Harvard Business Review,
2016). The Army agrees, and it employed an exit interview survey until recently.
Additionally, in 2020, the Army implemented the Department of the Army
Career Engagement Survey (DACES), which is e-mailed to every soldier
every year during his/her birth month. Interestingly, the Army received as
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many DACES responses in its first two months as it had received exit interview
responses in the previous two years, so the Army recently wound down its exit
interview survey and uses the DACES for the same purpose. The DACES
data is likely more valid as it allows for longitudinal perspectives on the same
population leading to their exits (or retention), while exit interview data are
gathered once during an emotional time.
As we had hoped, the BCE paper has the Army talking. An Army
component commander to a Department of Defense combatant command
shared it with his generals at his recent command conference. At least two
of the branch schoolhouses are sharing it at their colonel- and lieutenant
colonel-level pre-command courses. We have had the opportunity to present
it to the brigade and battalion command teams of an Army division and to a
forward-deployed general staff. To start these conversations, we invited the
participants to list the names of the lieutenants who served in their companies
when they were company commanders. We then requested they identify one
third of those lieutenants as high-potential (HIPO). Next, we asked them to
mark whether each lieutenant stayed in the Army long enough to be a company
commander. Finally, we asked them to calculate their Company Commander
Effect (CCE) and CCEHIPO. Most of them completed our request, and then the
conversation about the BCE and BCEHIPO really flowed. Some of them responded
with, “But I don’t know if LT Smith or LT Nguyen stayed in or got out.” Those
commanders may have other issues.
Overall, our colleague’s feedback is very well taken, as our profession
encourages this sort of dialogue. His comments add to a conversation that
already includes significant responses from current and former officers. Much
reaction has been in the form of, “Yes! My battalion commander was terrible,
and he/she influenced me to get out,” or “My commander was inspirational
and, look at me, I’m still here after 20 years.” We have also received a
moderate amount of pushback, some of it similar to our colleague’s comments
on potential omitted variable bias.
Interestingly, we have been asked, “Is there an equivalent of the BCE on
junior enlisted soldiers?” We believe it might be the platoon sergeant effect
(PSE), because a platoon sergeant is typically a sergeant first class, the first senior
non-commissioned officer rank, tenured in the organization (for example,
selected by a Department of the Army centralized selection board) and able
to remain in the Army until well after minimum retirement age. A platoon
sergeant is also two supervisory levels above most of his or her junior enlisted
soldiers, similar to a battalion commander being two supervisory levels above
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his or her lieutenants. We would encourage future empirical research on this
hypothesized PSE.
Again, we thank our colleague for his important contribution to this
valuable conversation. As our nation’s threat environment grows ever
more complex, quality leaders will become even more important than
they were in the past. The Army’s success crucially depends on ensuring
its best lieutenants decide to stay. If the BCE idea helps senior officers
think more about how they are impacting the retention of their junior
officers, especially their highest potential ones, our future Army stands to be
even more ready to fight and win.
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